



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

in the responses of organisms. There is not a scintilla of evidence that *fixed* and automatic reactions do not appear with the first appearance of organisms. And there is abundant reason to say that each new species as it appears, *e. g.*, by mutation (see the work of Tower *et al.*), gives evidence of a reflex repertoire and of a plastic repertoire. Titchener argues that the reason we do not see this complete plasticity (which would be called for on his theory) in the unicellular form to-day, is that the protozoa have travelled all the way from plasticity to fixity.

Looking at the book as a whole, it seems to the reviewer that in many places Titchener has adhered too rigidly to the introspective method. Surely in his treatment of *meaning* he could have leaned advantageously a little way toward the functional side, without giving up the guiding principles of the book. Nevertheless in this day when, if I can read the signs aright, the pendulum is swinging another way—toward a study of life-situations as a whole, and the adequacy, permanency and different types of adjustment which such situations call forth—Titchener gives us an enviable example of a man unafraid of his own views of the problems of psychology, and of his own methods of solving them. JOHN B. WATSON

The Johns Hopkins University

L'année psychologique, publ. par A. BINET, avec la collaboration de LARGUIER DES BANCELS et Dr. TH. SIMON, etc. Seizième année. Paris, Masson et Cie. 1910, pp. ix, 500.

The introduction reviews the progress of psychology in 1909, treating especially the work on thought and on pathological states, and the work in experimental pedagogy and judicial psychology. The first original contribution, by A. Binet, is entitled "The physical signs of intelligence in children." Greater or less degrees of correlation are found between intelligence and size of head, the so-called signs of degeneracy (abnormally shaped head, ears, etc.), facial expression, and hands. The habit of biting the finger-nails is found to be without significance in this respect. The correlations found hold in general only for the group, not always for the individual. The physical signs are useful for confirming, rather than for making, estimates of intellectual level. Next in order is an examination of the art of Rembrandt, by A. and A. Binet. The authors attempt to show how, by avoiding extremes of contrast and by accentuating unity of lighting, Rembrandt has succeeded in giving those impressions of distance, of unity, and of light which characterize his work. "Tachistoscopic Researches," by B. Bourdon, is an investigation of the times of choice-reactions made by observers to whom colors, rectangles of different lengths and figures, have been tachistoscopically exposed. The writer measures the time of reactions involving judgments of resemblance, identification, localization, comparison, or combinations of these processes. The eight following papers, by A. Binet and Th. Simon, are concerned with defining the various mental derangements. Up to the present, the authors believe, definitions have been too inclusive and general, have failed to show the *essential* characteristic which marks off the disorder, and have been couched in terms only partly psychological. They themselves classify the derangements as (1) hysteria, (2) derangement with knowledge (fears, impulses, etc.), (3) manic-depressive insanity, (4) systematized insanity (paranoia), (5) the dementias (general paresis, senile dementia, dementia præcox), and (6) subnormality. They consider the history of the conceptions of the various disorders, the theories propounded and the attempts at definition. They also review the characteristic mental states, symptoms, and attitudes of patients, both as reported by others, and as shown by the new data here published. They compare the special derangement under consideration with the other types of derangement, and finally arrive at a conclusion as to its essential character. Of hysteria, they find character-

istic, separation; of derangement with knowledge, conflict; of manic-depressive insanity, domination; of paranoia, deviation; of the dementias, disorganization; of subnormality, arrest of development. The psychological significance of these terms is discussed and explained at length, and an attempt is made to bring them all into relation. "Judicial Diagnosis by the Association-method," by A. Binet, argues against unlimited confidence in the method for application in practice. The writer reviews the experiments of Henke and Eddy and of Yerkes and Berry, pointing out chances for error, and showing on both theoretical and practical grounds that the method, as used in the laboratory or classroom, is not suited to the conditions of the criminal court. The psychological literature of 1909 is reviewed by Beaunis, Binet, Bovet, Languier des Bancelles, Maigre, and Stern, under the headings of physiological psychology, sensations and movements, perceptions and illusions, associations, attention, memory and images, language, feelings, aesthetics, thought, suggestion, individual psychology, child psychology and pedagogy, animal psychology, judicial psychology, pathology, dreams, treatises and methods, and philosophical questions.

W. S. FOSTER

Il sentimento giuridico. GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO. Seconda Edizione. Roma: Fratelli Bocca, 1908. pp. 26.

Professor del Vecchio, of the University of Sassari, who has previously published several articles on kindred topics,—*L'etica evoluzionista* (1903), *Diritto e personalità umana nella storia del pensiero* (1904),—discusses in the present monograph the "feeling (or sense) of justice" in man, its origin and development. From the time of Aristotle down this "sense of justice" has been attributed to man, but the philosophers have disputed much as to its primary or derived character (these arguments the author briefly summarizes). According to Professor del Vecchio, "the origin and nature of the sense of justice is essentially a problem of the metaphysical order" (p. 12). This, however, does not prejudice in any way the analysis of the psychic *datum* and its proper functions. The "sense of justice" is thus "primary and normal *datum* of the ethical conscience, an element or an aspect of it; and its nature is affective and, at the same time, ideological." A fundamental and distinctive characteristic of the "sense of justice" is its independence of all exterior sanction,—that is just, which is right independent of all positive historical sanction. Thus justice and law differ. No prescription of law can destroy this original faculty of conscience to oppose itself, as supreme principle, to the authority of constituted law (p. 23), this, Hobbes to the contrary notwithstanding. The philosophy of law is rooted in the "juridical vocation of conscience." The "sense of justice" is "the anthropological exigence of law, its primary indication, and the psychic expression of its human necessity."

ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN

Sulla Craniologia degli Herero. DOTT. SERGIO SERGI. Roma, 1908. pp. 10. (Estr. dal *Boll. d. R. Accad. Med. di Roma*, Anno XXXIV, Fasc. I).

Contributo allo Studio del Lobo frontale et parietale nelle Razze umane. Osservazioni sul Cervello degli Herero. Pel DOTT. SERGIO SERGI. Roma: Fratelli Pallotta, 1908. p. 107, 1 pl.

In the first of these studies Professor S. Sergi gives the results of his examination (description, measurements) of 6 male crania of the Herero (a Bantu people of Damara Land, German Southwest Africa), now in the collection of the Anatomical Institute, Berlin. The skull-capacities range from 1,315 to 1,590 ccm. (4 are 1,500 or over); the cephalic indices from 67.5 to 72.9 (4 below 71). The Herero have a skull-capacity approaching that of the Kaffirs of the S. E. coast,—it is a curious fact that the Bantu peoples of the S. W. and S. E. coasts have a cranial capacity greater than that of those of Central Africa and the region of the upper Congo. The cephalic index of the Herero ranks them among the more dolichocephalic